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Tears Of Ink
Email from frequent Old War Dogs contributor Roberto Prinselaar (USN 1948-1957, USCG 1967-1989). I added the Amazon link.:
Seriously, folks, this is one you really need a copy of. Check out Bob's Old War Dogs contributions and his IWVPA page . Tears of Ink My tears of ink flow down my pen |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on August 27, 2007 at 06:01 PM in , , | | | |
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This summer's must read
Read the whole thing . |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on August 15, 2007 at 12:03 AM in , , , , | | | |
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An Enormous Crime; The Gospel of POW Hell
The latest from poet and POW/MIA activist Marsha Burks Megehee:
Inspired by the book I should have my ass kicked for not having it finished by now but please check out the site I'm building for Marsha anyway. |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on July 31, 2007 at 03:02 PM in , , | | | |
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How to help lose a war without really trying
Prerequisites:
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Contributed by Bill Faith on July 5, 2007 at 08:37 PM in , | | | |
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In my mail: "Lone Survivor"
Lone Survivor Actually it came Tuesday but between a visit from my grandson, the No Illegal Left Behind battle and having a bunch of errands to run Friday it took me till yesterday afternoon to get started reading it. I can tell already it's not going to be a fun read but it will definitely be an interesting read. I'll be back with a more detailed report later. For now check out Blackfive's post and read a sample chapter . |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on July 1, 2007 at 01:32 AM in , , | | | |
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"The One"
I'm not going to have a lot to say about this one till the review copy I've been promised arrives but do check out here and follow the links. I already know enough just from that post to know this won't be a book I have to make myself make time to read simply because I promised to review it. I can hardly wait till it gets here and it will affect my blogging when it does. *** Read the first chapter of the book online . (H/T: ) |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on June 12, 2007 at 12:53 AM in , , , | | | |
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Colonel Bud Day, American Patriot
Many thanks to Rurik for permission to copy of an excellent book we were both privileged to receive review copies of. I may or may not manage to put together a review of my own later, knowing that anything I do will suffer greatly by comparison to Rurik's piece. In the short term, I'm nowhere close to done with my copy, due in no small part to the fact my sister and nephew both recognized it as something they'd enjoy. I have read enough of it to know I heartily agree with Rurik's recommendation to buy a copy at the first opportunity. (I've provided a convenient link for that purpose .) For now then, Rurik's review:
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Contributed by Bill Faith on May 18, 2007 at 12:56 AM in , , , , , , | | | |
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"Don't Tread on Me"
Actually, is the title of the New York Sun column but the book in question is R J Del Vecchio emails:
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Once again, the book is |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on February 28, 2007 at 03:23 PM in , , , , , , , , , | | | |
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Today's recommended reading: A history lesson
Read the whole thing, then buy the book. I have a copy and I can't recommend it highly enough. |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on January 24, 2007 at 09:58 AM in , , | | | |
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"The two of you did visit the same country, didn't you?"
Recommended prior reading:
Read George's review I linked at the top of the post, read the Owens review, and if you can spare the time listen to that Podcast. They're all excellent, as is the book itself. |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on January 6, 2007 at 11:09 AM in , , | | | |
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Another Good Man Tells the Truth About Another Bad Man.
One of the bravest and most intransigent of the Cold War Russian dissidents was Vladimir Bukovsky. Among his experiences he spent over a decade in prison or confined to the Serbsky Institute for the (Politically) Mentally Ill. His diagnosis was "Sluggish Schizophrenia", a mental disorder confirmed by the total lack of any symptoms other than disliking Soviet reality. In December 1976 he was ransomed in exchange for the Chilean communist Luis Corvalan. Settling in England he gained an advanced degree in Zoology while continuing as a teller of truth about the Soviet Union. He memoir To Build a Castle is one of the classic dissident works of the Twentieth Century, and a book which has strengthened Rurik's backbone in political bad times. Now Vladimir Bukovsky again tells the truth about Ted "The Swimmer" Kennedy.
But this is not an old story, of interest only to antiquarians; the results remain relevant even into the present. Remember that the Kennedy mob still runs Crassachusetts, and who are Ted's' political clients. The article is long, so go fetch yourself a beer and then read . A tip of the helmet to "Cap'n Fergie" -Rurik |
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Contributed by George Mellinger on December 30, 2006 at 09:06 PM in , , , , | | | |
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Power Line Interviews Mark Moyar
See previous related posts , , and .
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Contributed by Bill Faith on December 18, 2006 at 11:31 PM in , , | | | |
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Speaking frankly about Abu Carter -- Update (Updated)
See previous: . The third post in my series is up: Plagiarism's just the beginning. Not only did Abu Carter steal maps from another author, he relabeled them to make them fit his own personal "truth." It's long piece, which excerpts and links to an even longer piece, but I think you'll find it interesting reading. *** Those of you who love Johnny like I do may also enjoy *** Added 2006.12.10: |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on December 12, 2006 at 12:43 AM in , , , , , | | | |
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Speaking frankly about Abu "Holier than das Juden" Carter
Since John broached the subject and I brought it up again I guess I should mention that I've done two more related posts at my place: |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on December 10, 2006 at 01:41 PM in , , , , | | | |
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Understanding Restored, a Review of Triumph Forsaken
If Santayana is right that "those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it", it is even more true for those who remember the past wrongly. And this goes far to explain both why we have gotten ourselves in so much trouble in Iraq, and also why so many veterans of the Iraqi war are so dismissive of attempts to compare or even equate Iraq and Vietnam. The comparisons are often flawed because they are based on a completely erroneous legend of what actually happened in Vietnam. Now Mark Moyar, a professor of History specializing in the Viet Nam War has come to the rescue with Triumph Forsaken; The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Cambridge University Press, 2006). This book is the first of two volumes intended to provide a revised account of the Vietnam War till 1975, based on not only American sources but Vietnamese, Chinese, and other foreign sources as well. It is intended to be the first of two volumes, and ends with the introduction of US troops into ground combat. The second volume will complete the story, though if Dr. Moyar’s analysis and documentation are as thorough as in this first volume, I suspect the sequel will have to be split into two volumes. I certainly hope so. Though I served in Vietnam in later years, Triumph Forsaken seems far more believable than the standard "Anti-Imperialism For Dummies" version I have heard for so many years. It demolishes many mendacious myths and corrects many errors, some the results of subsequent propaganda. but others the result of information restricted at the time. Nor will this revision be to the comfort of only one political faction. I have had to revise personal opinions of some of the American actors. The Dr. Moyar’s hero clearly is Ngo Dinh Diem, who led Vietnam until his assassination in 1963. Certainly he was no democrat in the Western sense, but he had the confidence of the great majority of his people, who were accustomed to rule by a strong and wise leader. His alleged favoritism toward his family anc close associates was not only a cultural tradition, but also a reasonable measure in a society riven by factionalism and subversion. It was Diem who held the Vietnamese government together, and was gradually making it perform, and appeared to be gradually defeating the communist insurrection. The chapters dealing with Vietnam after his overthrow in November 1963 establish that everything was worse after he was gone. There are plenty of villains and inept buffoons. The first troublemaker was Elbridge Durbrow, the US Ambassador under Eisenhower. It was he who began poisoning relations, denouncing Diem for his failure to act like an American politician. He seems to have been the first of a string of unhelpful State Department officials, none of whom ever seem to have had a beneficial influence. perhaps the worst was Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge, what we would now call a "liberal Republican" was the presumptive Republican challenger to Jack Kennedy in 1964, and Kennedy appointed him ambassador to Vietnam in order to preempt Lodge from attacking his policies. But once Kennedy found that Lodge was creating new problems, and even defying direct instructions, he still felt politically unable to dismiss him. And so American foreign policy was shaped for domestic political advantage. And it was Lodge, not Kennedy who was responsible for the Diem coup, which made it impossible to stabilize the situation without introducing American troops. Sharing responsibility were many of the American reporters in Saigon. Some of the older hands reported a more objective story during the 1950s and early 1960s, but several young Turks, particularly David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan, made it their personal crusade to destroy the Diem government, all in the name of democratization. And they did so by habitually biased reporting. As is now known, some of their favorite "independent" sources, were secret Viet Cong agents. There were a number of other heroes at this early stage, particularly including the senior American advisors who tried to compensate for State Department disruption, and tried to give good military advice to both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. General Westmoreland has risen in my estimation, and even Robert McNamara seems to have given good and honest counsel at this early period. To me it sounds like a too familiar tale, the good work of the military being undone by the bungling of ideologically blinkered State Department officials and ignorant crusading press novices out to make a name for themselves regardless of the cost to their country or its allies. On the other side, Dr. Moyar examines the reality of North Vietnam, including the blood purges which accompanied and followed their independence, and their early campaign against the South. It turns out that the North Vietnamese army was infiltrating troops into the South from mid-1959, and dispatched its first divisional sized unit well before American ground forces entered combat. He also reminds us of the numerous atrocities and crimes committed in the south by the Communists. One of my few criticisms is that he could have better explained how the systematic murder of competent local officials was a major factor in the ineptitude of the southern government. Another myth badly in need of refuting is the claim that Ho Chi Minh was mainly a simple nationalist. Nobody who reads this book will ever buy that nonsense again. Ho throughout his life was a dedicated Communist internationalist. If anything, he was drawn even more to the Chinese than to the Soviets. So much for "traditional Sino-Vietnamese hatred"; one more myth down the toilet. Ho switched his preferences to the Soviets only after finding that the Chinese not willing to back up their bellicose promises with actions. Yet another myth debunked - the threat of Chinese intervention. Indeed, for me, one of the most interesting and impressive parts of this book was the first chapters giving the background of early Vietnamese history, laying the background of their own history of internal strife. It is also in this first chapter that I found my main problems, a couple of jarring anacronicities. There is a reference to threatening in 1954, to use "plaster China with nuclear bombs and missiles" - some years before we had such missiles. And there is another spot where he refers to Madame Nhu as a feminist; years before the term was even used in the west. Madame Nhu was certainly emancipated by traditional Vietnamese standards, was outspoken, and given to making impolitic comments. Btu she certainly was not a real feminist, as evidenced by many of her pro-morality, pro-family stances; some of us actually liked her. Dr. Moyar makes an interesting point, but he could have explained it better. Still, these are minor nits to pick with what is certainly one of the most important books of the last several years. This book is a must for anyone interested in either the Vietnam War, or in American security policy in general. -Rurik *** Bill Faith adds: I've posted information about this book , , and but still learned from George's review. I'm still in the process of digesting the book in manageable pieces as my health permits. (My lower back likes sitting in front of a PC much better than sitting in a chair with a book.) If George has succeeded where I failed in persuading you to buy a copy both my first two posts contain links to the appropriate Amazon.com page. |
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Contributed by George Mellinger on December 1, 2006 at 10:32 PM in , , | | | |
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The War That Could Have Been Won
Thanks go to R J Del Vecchio for the heads-up on the New York Sun's review of Triumph Forsaken, a book I've previously posted about and . Del writes:
Between back problems and eye problems I'm not much of a dead-tree reader but I've enjoyed and learned from the portion of Triumph Forsaken I've had time to digest. Please read the posts I linked earlier, then the Sun's review (linked and excerpted below), then do this old Dog a favor and use the Amazon link in one of my posts to get a copy of your own to study. This isn't just about Viet Nam, it's about not making the same mistakes again, which far too many in this country seem bound and determined to do.
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Contributed by Bill Faith on November 24, 2006 at 10:44 PM in , , | | | |
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Vale Jingcha
Vale Jingcha - Obituary for a Dear Friend On 14 September my dear friend Professor Frederic Wakeman Jr passed away from cancer. Although we had not corresponded for a couple of years he will be deeply missed. I knew Fred from his work on the Shanghai Municipal Police and he was a referee for my sojourn to Harvard in 2002. Fred was from the ‘Ernest Hemingway School of Hairy Chested Writing.’ An accomplished martial artist, he had a habit of turning up in unusual places throughout his life. He was involved in underground martial arts competitions in Taiwan and the odd pub brawl in London. As for his career prior to his becoming an academic, his book on Dai Li, the Chinese Spymaster was written with a working knowledge on this type of work. His back injury was initially caused when he carried a back pack around the jungles of a South East nation in 1960. Fred ended up in a wheelchair from surgery to reduce his pain which left him with a gammy left leg. He told me not to have surgery on my back and that is the reason I have not done it to this day. All I can say is raise a glass in his honour- Vale Jingcha. |
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Contributed by Martin Andrew on October 6, 2006 at 06:39 AM in , | | | |
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An Authorized Excerpt from Triumph Forsaken
I'm pleased to have been authorized to post a lengthy excerpt from an excellent book I've only begun to enjoy my copy of. If you're a Viet Nam vet, or care about one, you need a copy of Triumph Forsaken, which I posted about earlier . If you aren't and don't, but care about the direction our country's headed today and about learning from past mistakes, you still need a copy.
Triumph Forsaken The effects of the South Vietnamese government's poor performance from Ngo Dinh Diem's death until the middle of 1965 have been understood widely, but its causes have not. According to one standard explanation, the Saigon government failed because its leaders and its American advisers selected the wrong methods for combating the enemy. In truth, however, the problem was not in the concepts but in the execution. An explanation more commonly advanced, closer to the mark but still only partially correct, is that the South Vietnamese government faltered at this time because the country's ruling elite was bereft of strong leaders. Many individuals who occupied positions of power in the post-Diem period, it is true, did lack the necessary leadership attributes, and none was as talented as Diem, but the caliber of the elites as a whole was not a critical problem. The critical problems, rather, were the exclusion of certain elites from the government and the manipulation of governmental leaders by the militant Buddhist movement. From November 1963 onward, the top leadership in Saigon repeatedly removed men of considerable talent, either because of their past loyalty to Diem or because of pressure from the militant Buddhists. And in spite of these purges, the government still had some men, even at the very top at times, who possessed leadership capabilities that would have made them successful leaders had it not been for militant Buddhist conniving. The Buddhist leaders tried to bridle every government that held power after Diem, and in most instances they succeeded, largely because government officials feared resisting the Buddhist activists after watching Diem lose American favor, and his life, for resisting them. As its American advocates had desired, the 1963 coup led to political liberalization, but rather than improving the government as those Americans had predicted, liberalization had the opposite effect, enabling enemies of the government to undermine its prestige and authority, as well as to foment discord and violence between religious groups. Not until June 1965, by which time the United States and most South Vietnamese leaders had come to realize the necessity of suppressing the militant Buddhists and other troublemakers, would political stability return. By then, however, South Vietnam had sustained crippling damage and Hanoi was pushing for total victory. Lyndon Johnson's lack of forcefulness in Vietnam in late 1964 and early 1965 squandered America's deterrent power and led to a decision in Hanoi to invade South Vietnam with large North Vietnamese Army units. According to the prevailing historical interpretation, the leadership in Hanoi relentlessly pursued a strategy of attacking in the South until it won, with little regard for what its enemies did. In reality, however, North Vietnam's strategy was heavily dependent on American actions. Although Johnson's generals favored striking North Vietnam quickly and powerfully, he chose to follow the prescriptions of his civilian advisers, who advocated an academic approach that used small doses of force to convey America's resolve without provoking the enemy. Because of his chosen strategic philosophy and because of international and U.S. electoral politics, Johnson made only a token attack on North Vietnam following the Tonkin Gulf incidents of 1964 and undertook no military action thereafter. Rather than inducing the North Vietnamese to reciprocate with self-limitations, as the theorists predicted, however, this approach served only to heighten Hanoi's appetite and courage. Johnson's lack of action, as well as his presidential campaign rhetoric, convinced Hanoi that the Americans would not put up a fight for Vietnam in the near future. This change came at a time when the weakened condition of the Saigon government indicated that South Vietnamese resistance to a North Vietnamese invasion would be weak. Consequently, in November 1964, Hanoi began sending large North Vietnamese Army units to South Vietnam, with the intention of winning the war swiftly. The Americans were slow to identify the shift in North Vietnam's strategy and thus lost any remaining chance of deterring Hanoi or otherwise enabling South Vietnam to survive without U.S. combat troops. Some well-known historians have argued that President Johnson wanted to inject U.S. ground troops into the war whether they were needed or not. Johnson made his decision to intervene, they contend, at the end of 1964 or in early 1965. In actuality, Johnson reached his decision no earlier than the latter part of June 1965, by which time intervention had become the only means of saving South Vietnam. The first U.S. ground troops sent to Vietnam arrived in March 1965, but Johnson deployed them only to protect U.S. air bases, not to engage the main elements of the Communist forces. At the time of the initial ground force deployments, Johnson and his lieutenants did not foresee a major war between American and Communist forces, because they did not know that Hanoi had begun sending entire North Vietnamese Army regiments into South Vietnam. They did not learn of this development until the beginning of April. By the middle of June, abetted by a continuing infusion of North Vietnamese soldiers, the Communist forces had won many large victories and the South Vietnamese Army was losing its ability to challenge large Communist initiatives. The North Vietnamese had entered the third and final stage of Maoist revolutionary warfare, in which the revolutionaries use massed conventional forces to destroy the government's conventional forces. Hanoi's ultimate success, as its leaders repeatedly stated, depended above all on the ability of its conventional forces to destroy the South Vietnamese Army, particularly its mobile strategic reserve units, not South Vietnam's small counter-guerrilla forces. The fighting of 1965 demonstrated that, contrary to the contentions of a multitude of pundits and theoreticians, the Americans and the South Vietnamese had been correct to develop a large conventional South Vietnamese army during the 1950s and early 1960s rather than concentrate exclusively on small-unit warfare. Lyndon Johnson had always wanted to avoid putting U.S. troops into the ground war if there was any way that South Vietnam could continue the war without them. Like most of his advisers, he doubted that U.S. ground force intervention would result in an easy victory, believing instead that it would result in a long, painful, and politically troublesome struggle against an enemy who might never give up. But in June 1965, Johnson and his military advisers concluded, correctly, that only the use of U.S. ground forces in major combat could stop the Communist conventional forces from finishing off the South Vietnamese Army and government. Even as Johnson became convinced of the need for intervention, he held out hopes of withdrawing U.S. troops from Vietnam relatively soon, regardless of how the fighting was going, in the belief that a brief intervention might achieve as much as a sustained intervention in terms of preserving U.S. credibility and prestige in the world. Johnson decided that South Vietnam was worth rescuing in 1965 primarily because he dreaded the international consequences of that country's demise. His greatest fear was the so-called domino effect, whereby the fall of Vietnam would cause other countries in Asia to fall to Communism. Historians have frequently argued that Johnson fought for Vietnam primarily to protect himself against accusations from the American Right that he was soft on Communism, which would have harmed his reputation and denied him the political support he needed to carry out his domestic agenda. In actuality, the domestic political ramifications of losing Vietnam had relatively little influence on Johnson's decision on whether to protect South Vietnam. Johnson recognized that the American people were largely apathetic about Vietnam and would be no more likely to turn against him politically and personally if he left than if he stayed and fought. Domestic political considerations did, on the other hand, exert great influence on how Johnson protected South Vietnam, as they discouraged him from bridling Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, from taking a tough stance on Vietnam before the 1964 election, and from calling up the U.S. reserves and otherwise putting the United States on a war footing. That there has been great cynicism and confusion about Johnson's motives was partly the responsibility of the President himself, for during this period he repeatedly misrepresented his intentions to the American people and he did not provide decisive leadership that would have clarified his views and inspired the people's confidence. The domino theory was valid. The fear of falling dominoes in Asia was based not on simple-mindedness or paranoia, but rather on a sound understanding of the toppler countries and the domino countries. As Lyndon Johnson pondered whether to send U.S. troops into battle, the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that South Vietnam's defeat would lead to either a Communist takeover or the switching of allegiance to China in most of the region's countries. Information available since that time has reinforced this conclusion. Vietnam itself was not intrinsically vital to U.S. interests, but it was vital nevertheless because its fate strongly influenced events in other Asian countries that were intrinsically vital, most notably Indonesia and Japan. In 1965, China and North Vietnam were aggressively and resolutely trying to topple the dominoes, and the dominoes were very vulnerable to toppling. Throughout Asia, among those who paid attention to international affairs, the domino theory enjoyed a wide following. If the United States pulled out of Vietnam, Asia's leaders generally believed, the Americans would lose their credibility in Asia and most of Asia would have to bow before China or face destruction, with enormous global repercussions. Every country in Southeast Asia and the surrounding area, aside from the few that were already on China's side, advocated U.S. intervention in Vietnam, and most of them offered to assist the South Vietnamese war effort. The oft-maligned analogy to the Munich agreement of 1938 actually offered a sound prediction of how the dominoes would likely fall: Communist gains in one area would encourage the Communists to seek further conquests in other places, and after each Communist victory the aggressors would enjoy greater assets and the defenders fewer. Further evidence of the domino theory's validity can be found by examining the impact of America's Vietnam policy on other developments in the world between 1965 and the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, developments that would remove the danger of a tumbling of Asian dominoes. Among these were the widening of the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the civil war in Cambodia. America's willingness to hold firm in Vietnam did much to foster anti-Communism among the generals of Indonesia, which was the domino of greatest strategic importance in Southeast Asia. Had the Americans abandoned Vietnam in 1965, these generals most likely would not have seized power from the pro-Communist Sukarno and annihilated the Indonesian Communist Party later that year, as they ultimately did. Communism's ultimate failure to knock over the dominoes in Asia was not an inevitable outcome, independent of events in Vietnam, but was instead the result of obstacles that the United States threw in Communism's path by intervening in Vietnam. It has been said that the Johnson administration, in its first years, could have negotiated a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam that would have preserved a non-Communist South Vietnam for years to come. Evidence from the Communist side, however, reveals North Vietnam's complete unwillingness to negotiate such a deal. The Communists would not have agreed to a settlement in 1964 or 1965 that could have prevented them from gaining control of South Vietnam quickly. With their list of military victories growing longer and longer, with a clear and promising plan for conquering South Vietnam on the battlefield, the North Vietnamese had no reason to accept a diplomatic settlement that might rob them of the spoils. The Americans did miss some strategic opportunities of a different sort, opportunities that would have allowed them to fight from a much more favorable strategic position. In the chaotic period following Diem's overthrow, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other U.S. military leaders repeatedly advocated an invasion of North Vietnam. Johnson and his civilian advisers rejected this advice, however, on the grounds that an American invasion of the North could lead to a war between the United States and China. Historians have generally concurred in the assessment that Chinese intervention was likely. But the evidence shows that until at least March 1965, the deployment of U.S. ground forces into North Vietnam would not have prompted the Chinese to intercede. Having suffered huge losses in the Korean War, the Chinese had no more appetite for a war between themselves and the Americans than did their American counterparts. Johnson's failure to attack North Vietnam also worked to the enemy's advantage by facilitating a massive Chinese troop deployment into North Vietnam, which in turn freed up many North Vietnamese Army divisions for deployment to South Vietnam and made a subsequent U.S. invasion of North Vietnam much riskier. Another opportunity not taken -- one that never carried a serious risk of war with China -- was the cutting of the Ho Chi Minh Trail with American forces. Johnson rejected many recommendations from the Joint Chiefs to put U.S. ground forces into Laos to carry out this task, and on this point, too, historians have backed the President over his generals. The Johnson administration and some historians have argued that the Ho Chi Minh Trail was not essential to the Communist war effort, but new evidence on the trail and on specific battles makes clear the inaccuracy of this contention. The Viet Cong insurgency was always heavily dependent on North Vietnamese infiltration of men and equipment into South Vietnam through Laos, and it could not have brought the Saigon government close to collapse in 1965, or defeated it in 1975, without heavy infiltration of both. Other orthodox historians have argued that an American ground troop presence in Laos would not have stopped most of the infiltration, but much new evidence contradicts this contention as well. The United States, moreover, missed some valuable opportunities to sever Hanoi's maritime supply lines, although it did cut some of the most important sea routes in early 1965. In sum, South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United States during the period from 1954 to 1965. The aggressive expansionism of North Vietnam and China threatened South Vietnam's existence, and by 1965 only strong American action could keep South Vietnam out of Communist hands. America's policy of defending South Vietnam was therefore sound. U.S. intervention in Vietnam was not an act of strategic buffoonery, nor was it a sinister, warmongering plot that should forever stand as a terrible blemish on America's soul. Neither was it an act of hubris in which the United States pursued objectives far beyond its means. Where the United States erred seriously was in formulating its strategies for protecting South Vietnam. The most terrible mistake was the inciting of the November 1963 coup, for Ngo Dinh Diem's overthrow forfeited the tremendous gains of the preceding nine years and plunged the country into an extended period of instability and weakness. The Johnson administration was handed the thorny tasks of handling the post-coup mess and defending South Vietnam against an increasingly ambitious enemy -- and in neither case did the administration achieve good results. President Johnson had available several aggressive policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war either without the help of any American ground forces at all or with the employment of U.S. ground forces in advantageous positions outside South Vietnam. But Johnson ruled out these options and therefore, during the summer of 1965, he would have to fight a defensive war within South Vietnam's borders in order to avoid the dreadful international consequences of abandoning the country. Copyright © 2006 Mark Moyar from the book Triumph Forsaken by Mark Moyar Published by Cambridge University Press; August 2006;$32.00US; 0-521-86911-0 Mark Moyar holds a BA summa cum laude in history from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in history from Cambridge University. He is the author of Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong. Moyar has taught at Cambridge University, Ohio State University, and Texas A&M University. He is presently Associate Professor and Course Director at the United States Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on October 4, 2006 at 01:22 AM in , , | | | |
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Triumph Forsaken
2006.09.30 Update (Original timestamp 2006.09.27.00:32): I received my copy of Triumph Forsaken in yesterday's mail but haven't had time to begin to do more than just glance through it. It's not what I expected. It's better. Over 500 pages of hard-bound academically rigorous detail suitable for use as assigned reading -- Dream on, Bill. -- in university level history courses. Oh that we'd had books like this at UT instead of the leftist garbage I had to pretend believe to fulfill the history requirements for my BSEE. I intend to study it page by page as time permits, then make a feeble attempt at writing a review that does it justice. I won't get the job done (doing it justice) but on that point I'll take solace in the knowledge that George and Lloyd, both published authors themselves, also promised reviews in return for their copies. When I'm done with it it will become part of the "This is what Grandpa was about" library I'm gradually accumulating for Ian.
Triumph Forsaken: An accomplished young historian offers a revisionist view of one of the United States’ most reviled conflicts More than thirty years after the United States pulled its last military forces out of Vietnam it is safe to say that the majority of historians, political figures, and citizens view the United States’ decades long involvement in the Vietnam War as misguided. Given the benefit of hindsight, many have interpreted the war as a vain Cold War-era conflict fruitlessly fought during a time of great anti-Communist paranoia and leading to the needless deaths of tens of thousands of Americans and countless Vietnamese. The prevailing attitude about these assumptions has not changed much in recent years, even as the Vietnam War continues to drift further into the past. If nothing else, the orthodox view has strengthened with the passage of time. In Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (Publication Date: October 1, 2006; Cambridge University Press; $32) historian Mark Moyar boldly turns the traditional view of the Vietnam War on its head and offers a well-researched, well-reasoned and beautifully written account that reveals why so much of what many of us believe about the Vietnam War is wrong. Moyar challenges many of the key assumptions that historians have made about the early years of the conflict, including:
Moyar asserts that Ho was a fervent believer in Communism and would not have sacrificed Communist solidarity for the sake of Vietnam’s narrow interests.
Moyar asserts that Diem was in reality a very wise and effective leader. Moyar also believes that American journalists in Vietnam in the early 1960s (particularly David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan) were duped by cultural differences and, as a result, engaged in misguided reporting that helped turn public opinion away from Diem.
Moyar believes that the domino theory was a valid assumption based on a sound understanding of the countries involved. As President Lyndon Johnson pondered whether or not to send US troops into battle the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that South Vietnam’s defeat would lead to either a Communist takeover or the wholesale switching of allegiances to China of most countries in the region. It wasn’t just paranoia; during these early years of the war North Vietnam and China were aggressively attempting to topple the dominos of Asia.
While most historians agree with President Johnson’s assumption that an invasion of North Vietnam by US forces in 1964 or 1965 would have likely induced war with China, Moyar shows how the evidence proves that, at least until March 1965, the deployment of US ground forces into North Vietnam would not have prompted the Chinese to intercede.
President Johnson at the time, as well as many historians since, argued that the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a secret supply line that ran from North to South Vietnam through the neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia, was not essential to the Communist war effort. New evidence shows how the Trail was a vital resource to the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam. Basing his conclusions on a wealth of new material, including many North Vietnamese sources, Mark Moyar asserts that the Vietnam War might have been won during these early years, without the insertion of American ground forces, had some of these key blunders not occurred. Moyar believes that US intervention in Vietnam was based on sound assumptions and strategy and not, as many people have come to believe, wrongheaded hubris. Triumph Forsaken is a remarkable book that will change the way we view one of the most contentious moments in US history. Mark Moyar holds a BA summa cum laude in history from Harvard University and a Ph.D. in history from Cambridge University. He is the author of Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong. Moyar has taught at Cambridge University, Ohio State University, and Texas A&M University. He is presently Associate Professor and Course Director at the United States Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia I and two other Dogs have been promised review copies of Triumph Forsaken. We'll have more to say after we've seen them. |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on September 30, 2006 at 12:12 AM in , , | | | |
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The Blog of War
During the Second World War three American reporters achieved fame for their reporting from the front with the troops, and the books they wrote about the experiences. Richard Tregaskis wrote Guadalcanal diary. Bill Maulden, best known for his cartoons of the dogfaces Willie and Joe wrote Up Front, and Ernie Pyle, the most revered of all, wrote Brave Men. After surviving the war Tregaskis and Maulden returned home to the daily grind of civilian journalism. After surviving the campaigns form North Africa to Europe. Ernie Pyle was killed during the last days of the Pacific war. All three men were famed for focusing their attention on the lot of the common soldier, leaving the great matters of campaigns and strategy to others. However, even they could not capture the immediacy and intensity of the individual soldier’s life. For reasons of security and morale much had to be omitted, and more toned down, removing the grittiness which might shock back home. During Viet Nam, the relationship was entirely different, as the politicized media appeared to have taken sides and mutual suspicion between troops and journalists was the rarely achieved "best" relation. This reviewer found that the war he was fighting and the war being reported were two totally unrelated events. To a great extent, losing the media battle was what lost the Viet Nam war. During the first Gulf War of 1991, military-media relations did not sink to the Depths of Viet Nam, but were still marked by mistrust. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, something new has happened, the rise of the internet and widespread blogging. Deployed troops can take their laptop computers with them and communicate home directly on a realtime basis. But so long as this is done by email, the effect is no more than letters home. What has truly made the difference is the rise of blogging technology appropriated by the deployed troops for instantaneous communication. For the first time an individual warrior can aspire to tell his side of the story, not just to his immediate family and neighbors but to all the world. If today, Walter Cronkite were to report a litany of defeats, ending with a portentous "And that’s the way it is", even before the administration spokesmen could cobble together a clumsy defense, he would be hooted down in cyberspace by angry soldiers denouncing his lies and telling their stories for themselves. For some of us, the Bush administration’s greatest ineptitude has been its public relations effort, so lame it might have cost us the war under previous conditions, but saved today, by the troops themselves and their un-brigaded supporters back home. They are doing for themselves what Ernie, Bill, and Richard did sixty years ago, and arguably doing it even better. The two largest and most important of these public milblogs certainly are and . Not much is known of Greyhawk, the owner and commander of Mudville, save that he is a serving Air Force Officer living in Germany, and judging by the F-16s on his site banner, probably with the 52 Fighter Wing. More is known about Blackfive. He is Matthew Currier Burden, who left the Army in 2001 with the rank of Major, after a long and active career, often at the pointy end of the spear. In mid 2003 he took the name Blackfive for himself and his new website expressly to report the news which he felt the professional media were ignoring; since then, the site has gained a large following and today is the twentieth ranked blog by visits. Rated by the more subjective measure of quality, is easily within the top five sites (Though the Old War Dogs have picked up the scent and are baying on his trail.) Now Blackfive has written a book, The Blog of War, published in paperback by Simon & Schuster. This book is the story of milblogging as told by the milbloggers in their own words, taken from their posts of the last three years. Extended selections are taken from fifty or more blogs, including a few which have subsequently suspended activity. Several of these blogs have contributed passages for more than one chapter. The very nature of blogging tends to weed out the inarticulate and uncommitted, but Matt has selected the best of the crop. And he has done a further remarkable job of arrangement, choosing the order in which accounts appear, and linking them into a coherent and logical sequence. This is not as easy as it appears. I know; my books are also based on collating related, but discrete narratives, so I have a special appreciation for what Matt has accomplished. Frankly, he has succeeded better than I. And finding just the right passage from each blog, assuring that the most important milblogs are all represented is a task involving heroic research of a sort which cannot be accomplished by search engine. it requires eyeball examination of judgement of dozens of blogs, and thousands of discreet posts. In the first chapter several of these bloggers explain to their families why they volunteered to go. Some of these accounts are heart-wrenching, and others inspiring. The next chapter describes the living conditions, day-to-day, of troops stationed in the war zone. It seems that wars always take place in desolate and barely liveable places, and if the place, such as Italy or Northen France, were not intolerable at the start of hostilities, it quickly becomes so. Spartan living is a major factor which sets apart soldiers on active duty, all of them, including those assigned to non-combat duties. And the living conditions in Iraq sound to me particularly unpleasant, even more after reading these accounts. The next three chapters are entitled "The Healers", "Leaders, Warriors, and Diplomats", and "The Warriors". "Healers" of course contains the accounts of the nurses, doctors, and corpsmen, and includes accounts of saving the wounded, and sometimes failing to do so. And sometimes the wounded are Iraqis, even jihadis. The next two chapters seem remarkably close to each other. Leaders, Warriors, and Diplomats" includes more accounts of elections and civic action, though these areas often blend seamlessly. I might have placed "The Healers" third in the sequence rather than first, but that is a matter of author’s decision, and is a very minor difference in approaches. There is plenty of intense action and pucker here, and the chosen accounts communicate the experience with rare intensity. If you have friends or family over there, be sure to read these chapters, and you may better understand why they have come home more tightly strung and edgy than you remembered them. War is not intended to be pleasant for anyone. These chapters in particular I had to read in relatively small doses. Perhaps one of the most moving sections of this book for me was the chapter "The Homefront", accounts blogged by anxiously waiting family members. It is true that the folks back home who have never been to war cannot understand what war is really like for the troops participating. But it is equally impossible for those troops to completely comprehend the fears of those consigned to wait helplessly at home, knowing little and understanding less of what is going on. And powerless to do anything beyond worry. The soldier becomes sensitized to the shriek of the siren, his wife to the ring of the telephone. This is a side of war I have not experienced. Matt’s book has helped me to make a start on understanding. "The Fallen" relates the saddest experience, accounts of wives who have lost their husbands, and of soldiers who have lost a comrade in battle, perhaps right at their side. Again this is another essential chapter which must be read, but should be read in small doses. This is not the typical flowery "sweet to die for..." tribute. it is a much more powerful tribute to those who sacrificed their lives, and to those who sacrificed almost as much, those they loved. The last chapter, "Homecoming" is a bittersweet ending, the joy of homecoming, and the difficulty, the shock of readjusting that is a part of the experience. Finally the book’s Epilogue lists the bloggers whose contributions appeared in each chapter, and gives their names and a few details about each including an update on their current status. As I had become quite fond of several of these individuals through their blogs, it was a treat to learn their names and details that have not appeared on their blogs. I give Blog of War my highest recommendation. If you are a veteran, of any war, it will help you place your own experience in better perspective. if you only know, or are related to a veteran or active warrior, this book is even more important for you to understand what is going on. I warn you, it should be read in small doses, but it must be read. Old soldiers aren’t supposed to get weepy-eyed, so I guess it must have just been a bad allergy season for me. Never before has the American soldier been as well reported. For maintaining and publishing this book, Matt Burden certainly has joined the elite circle of Richard Tregaskis, Bill Maulden and Ernie Pyle, perhaps at the lead of that list. This Old War Dog says a sincere and deeply felt, "Thanks, Matt." -Rurik |
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Contributed by George Mellinger on September 29, 2006 at 12:53 AM in , , , , , , , | | | |
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"The Blog Of War"
Matthew Currier Burden is the one and only . This is the "best from the MilBlogs" book that he's devoted several months of effort to, and it's everything you'd expect from a writer of his caliber. Why does it not surprise me that he'd give it away to our current generation of warriors? I've been enjoying my copy a few pages at a time, making it last, enjoying every page. Enlisted military: Email from a .mil address or find some other way to convince me you're legit and I'll email back with the password for your free copy. Thank you for your service. |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on September 25, 2006 at 02:20 AM in , , , | | | |
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The Blog Of War
Just a note that Matthew Currier "Blackfive" Burden has finally gotten around to announcing that his book is out. "Can you handle the truth?... (Simon & Schuster) is loaded with firsthand reports from the Internet diaries of soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Grab it before the Pentagon orders it burned..." - Vanity Fair, September 2006 Go read Matt's post about it , then make an old Dog happy by using that button on the left (or the one on the sidebar) to order your copy. I haven't had a chance yet to do more than flip through but that was enough I can affirm that it's just as great as I expected it to be. ***
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Contributed by Bill Faith on September 5, 2006 at 02:58 AM in , , | | | |
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In my mail: The Blog Of War
The project Blackfive's been working on for the last several months, collecting the best of the best; the best posts from the best of the MilBlogs. I only allowed myself to spend a few minutes flipping through it so far but I can tell already it's everything we knew it would be. Don't expect a report on this one any time real soon. I haven't finished yet and after I do I'll continue to spend some time reminding you you need a copy. It may take me a while to get through The Blog Of War, taking time to enjoy the experience as I do, trying not to forget I have a blog to run for too long at a time. xxxxxxx (Post reformatted 2006.08.31. The webmaster just learned a new programming trick.) |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on August 30, 2006 at 04:03 PM in , | | | |
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FLASH: Isikoff Tells All...Aww shucks, it's nothing.
So, what have we here? Essentially, a big, fat, Greek nothing [more apologies to Joel Zwick & Nia Vardalos]. No serious person, not even Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald, no one not afflicted with Bush Derangement Syndrome believes that there was a crime here. Isikoff is careful to exonerate Mr. Armitage of any intention to "smear" Valerie Plame and Joseph Wilson.
Just in passing: exposing falsehoods disseminated by present or former government officials, such as those of Ambassador Wilson, used to be known as setting the record straight, not as smearing someone. The delicate nuances of goring oxen must be observed. Isikoff's article reveals other interesting tidbits, such as that Robert Woodward got the word from Mr.Armitage a couple of weeks before Robert Novak did. Woodward's mature judgment that the Plame-Wilson saga was a nonstory has earned him a chorus of Bronx cheers from the herd of independent minds in the media. Woodward is a big boy, and has had no problem brushing that sort of lint off of his well-tailored blazer. The final paragraph offers an insight into the vicious, witch-hunting mentality of the White House inner circle. Secretary Powell, Mr. Armitage, and William Howard Taft IV, legal counsel to the State Department were concerned lest news of Armitage's action might leak and damage the Department. So Mr. Taft took the precaution of alerting the White House:
Get the implication. The White House, which has been repeatedly flayed in the media for "outing" Valerie Plame, learned of the story from the State Department. President Bush's hit-man, Gonzales, apparently never breathed a word to anyone in the media. So much for the "first draft of history." One final note: poor Valerie Plame did not even get a cover photo out of this story. Heartless, soulless Newsweek devotes its September 4 cover to an inanimate chunk of orbiting space junk call Pluto or some such thing. Shameful. *** The webmaster adds: John, there's more coverage, not as good as yours, at and . I've posted an excerpt and a link to this post at . |
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Contributed by John Werntz on August 27, 2006 at 07:48 AM in , , , , | | | |
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Blackfive revealed! ... and, his book is out!
Matthew Currier Burden. It even says so now. If there was any announcement on his site when he unmasked I wasn't paying attention, nor did I see any announcement when the book became available. Fortunately .
People, I'm so broke right now I can't even pay attention but the first thing I'm going to do as soon as I publish this post is to order a copy of Matt's book. This is the project he's been working on for the last several months, collecting the best of the best; the best posts from the best of the MilBlogs. I'll update this post with a detailed review as soon as my copy gets here and I have time to read it -- You'll know I got my copy when I go two or three days without posting. Do an old dog a favor and use the link above to buy your copy. *** Just received my email confirmation from Amazon that my order is being processed. *** Gotta shout out a big THANK YOU to . Not only did she take pity and leave money in my tip jar to cover the cost of my copy of the book, the Amazon link in her post is coded so Old War Dogs gets a commission on any copies her post sells. A true Angel. |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on August 25, 2006 at 11:32 PM in , , | | | |
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Tony Blankley: Pat Buchanan's 'State of Emergency'
(Click "Continue reading" to access an Amazon button and buy your own copy of the subject book.) |
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Contributed by Bill Faith on August 16, 2006 at 02:23 AM in , , , , | | | |
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The importance of Misty in Viet Nam
A not so brief word on my relative absence the last few days. I have been busy - back in Viet Nam at a time before my tour occurred. By book, but not just any book. I’ve been reading, nearly round-the-clock. All of us who were in Viet Nam knew about the FACs, the Forward Air Controllers. These were pilots who flew small Cessna O-1 Bird Dog aircraft slow and low over the battlefield, armed only with smoke rockets which they used for marking targets from the air for attack by faster moving jets. Of course this was hazardous work, since the aircraft could be easily shot down by even the lightest of infantry weapons, and then his only chance of survival would be to crash his aircraft somewhere away from the angry VC, and hope that a helicopter or US troops would find him first. Repeatedly these pilots made a difference down South. But what about over North Viet Nam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail? There a FAC was just as essential if bombing was ever to hit anything, but when the North Vietnamese began stiffening the defenses with of lots of 37mm and 57mm antiaircraft weapons, an O-1 Bird Dog would not last long enough to call in an airstrike. The solution to this problem was (then) Major George "Bud" Day, famous for his resistance as a POW. In July 1967 he organized a top secret unit at Phu Cat air base equipped with F-100F Super Sabres to perform high speed FAC duties over the southern part of North Viet. Nam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They took the call sign "Misty". The F-100F was an armed, two seat combat trainer version of the single seat F-100D fighter. The original F-100A had been the first US combat aircraft capable of breaking Mach 1 in level flight, but by the summer of 1967 it was a bit long in the tooth, though still very capable of carrying bombs and rockets, and reaching up north. On FAC missions the second seal was used for a second pilot functioning as observer. However, this was still extremely hazardous. Bud Day was shot down and captured during one of the early missions. Of the 157 pilots who flew with Misty between July 1967 and May 1970 when they stood down, 34 were shot down, two of them twice, a loss rate of 22%. Three were captured, and 7 declared MIA. And this despite the fact that most of the Mistys flew only four month details as a part of their one year combat tours. Certainly one of the most hazardous duties during the war. The story is now told in Bury Us Upside Down, The Misty Pilots and the secret Battle for the Ho Chi Minh Trail, by Rick Newman and Don Shepperd, Ballantine Books, 2006. About two years ago, I became friendly with Don Shepperd via e-mail discussion during the last election. At the time, I knew little about him, save that he had retired from the Air Force as a Major General and commander of the Air National Guard. Only later did I learn that he had flown 58 missions as a Misty from December 1967 to April 1968, one of the war’s most difficult periods, making him eminently qualified to write this book. In fact he personally participated in several of their most momentous moments, including the first encounters with SA-2 missiles along The Trail, and was part of the mission which discovered that the Lang Vei SF camp had been overrun by NVA tanks, for their first use during the war. Don Shepperd, who describes his own activities in a detached third person, gives far more attention to the other Misty members. Another of their famous alumni was Dick Rutan, now famous for his unrefueled round the world flight in 1986 aboard the Voyager. Though there is a load of adventure here, and all the vicarious pucker any reader could want, there is also much insight about the Air force and the air war, adding to our understanding of what they contributed, and how they fell short. And there is also much tragedy. About 20% of the book is devoted to the issue of the POWs and the question of the MIAs., during and after the war, and is one of the most useful and enlightening sections. The author shows that the Air Force was well-meaning but seriously insensitive in dealing with the families of the POWs and MIAs. They refused to share information, tried to order around civilian family members as if they too were military, and sometimes even treated them as a nuisance best shoved into the attic. But he also has some insightful, if sympathetic criticism of some of the families, who lost control of their emotions, refused to face reality and sometimes did things not well considered, which made the situation worse, by playing into the hands of the Vietnamese communists. The North Vietnamese had scant regard for their own people, whom they sacrificed with reckless abandon, and were amazed at the fanatic devotion the Americans showed to their missing and prisoners. They recognized this as America’s weakness, and learned to use it to their advantage. This section should be read and considered by people contemplating our current military situation and the near future. Bury Us Upside Down is a book which should be read by three groups of people, those like me who are airplane nuts, those like me who are seriously interested in the Viet Nam War, and those like me who care deeply about military issues. And anybody else who wants a book full of heart-pausing action. -Rurik |
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Contributed by George Mellinger on August 8, 2006 at 03:18 PM in , , , | | | |
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Resistance is not futile
A "Best of Old War Dogs" featured post. The webmaster is using a bogus timestamp to keep this post near the top of the blog for a while. Please scroll down for newer posts. This item was originally posted 2006.07.27.13:05. This takes me back to the days when I was a grad student, studying Russian history. Among my professors was an English gentleman, named Keith Armes, who was my first Russian language instructor. He was a man who broke our balls learning the language, and broke his own balls in driving us. As a result, I learned Russian. In contrast, my Arabic instructor was interested in "being a nice guy' and being liked by his students. Consequently, though I got better grades in Arabic, I retain almost none of it today. There is a lesson in there for those paying attention. In addition to teaching Russian language, Dr. Armes taught a series of courses in Soviet Literature, both the dissident, unofficial and the official literature. One entire quarter was devoted to Solzhenitsyn. Keith was additionally a rare bird in his overt anti-Communism, but he knew how to appreciate a text on its merits. And though I studied some remarkably obnoxious books, I also found some which were praiseworthy. And one which was unique. Yesterday from the Wall Street Journal brought me back to the past. Evgenii Zamyatin's novel We is about to be republished in a new translation. Evgenii Zamyatin was an engineer and a recognized writer, in the O. Henry mode. He was also an Old Bolshevik, a member of Lenin's party from years prior to World War I. After the revolution he returned to Russia from England, but very quickly became disillusioned with Leninism, and became perhaps the first "ex-Communist". During 1920-21 Zamyatin wrote his distopic novel We as a warning of the mistake of collectivism, and what he saw in the offing. As part of my Master's program, I had to write a paper outside my History major. I chose Russian literature and wrote a 60 page Master's paper on Zamyatin's We. While other literature and language scholars had already published a number of books and journal articles on the artistic merits and symbolism of We, some of it very good, and some not so much so, I did something different, even bold. I focused my paper on the question of the accuracy of Zamyatin's portrayal an forecast. How did his bitter portrayal foreshadow the realities of later, actual socialist systems? The answer was that Zamyatin was indeed a prophet. But then personal problems arose. Before I completed the paper, Keith Armes had moved on to another University and a different professor took over the task of evaluating my paper. The daughter of one of the 1930s Moscow Reproters and a Russian mother who still followed Stalin (I met her) this professor objected strenuously to most of what I wrote, initially refusing to accept my paper. I had to go back and spend months doing further research to support peripheral points. Among other things this led me into a study of the abuses of psychiatry by the Soviets - including "Sluggish Schizophrenia" a mental illness diagnosed by the complete absence of any symptoms, save for dissidence. As it happened, her attempt to stifle my paper backfired and led to my writing a much stronger paper, and expanding my knowledge. On my second submission, she had to accept it, but still tried to get me to change aspects which seemed to offend her. I told her a polite variation of "pack sand". And there is another lesson here. You can stand up to the PC crowd. In fact, their pressure can force you to learn, and to become a better student, even when that is not their intention (and occasionally when it is). But anyway, go read the review,and then read We. If you can find the original translation by Mirra Ginzburg, I would recommend it, but even the new re-translation, is worth the time, and I will certainly read it myself to see what changes can bother me. Among other points of interest, this book disproves the popular claim that nobody foresaw the collapse of the Soviet Union. Zamyatin foresaw it in 1920-21, and in a way that eerily foreshadowed the details of what happened in 1990-91. -Rurik |
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Contributed by George Mellinger on July 29, 2006 at 06:00 PM in , , , | | | |