Background Information
Contributed by Zero Ponsdorf
Time will validate the conclusions here, or not. This is two days old and, as they say, the situation is fluid. Stratfor: Alerts - July 13, 2006
Middle East Crisis:
Backgrounder
Israel lives with three realities: geographic, demographic
and cultural. Geographically, it is at a permanent disadvantage, lacking
strategic depth. It does enjoy the advantage of interior lines -- the
ability to move forces rapidly from one front to another. Demographically,
it is on the whole outnumbered, although it can achieve local superiority
in numbers by choosing the time and place of war. Its greatest advantage is
cultural. It has a far greater mastery of the technology and culture of war
than its
neighbors.
Two of the realities cannot be changed. Nothing
can be done about geography or demography. Culture can be changed. It is not inherently the case that Israel will have a technological
or operational advantage over its neighbors. The great inherent fear
of
Israel is that the Arabs will equal or surpass Israeli prowess culturally and therefore militarily. If that were to happen, then all three realities
would turn against Israel and Israel might well be at risk.
That is why the capture of Israeli troops, first one in the south, then two in the
north, has galvanized Israel. The kidnappings represent a level of Arab
tactical prowess that previously was the Israeli domain. They also
represent a level of tactical slackness
on the Israeli side that was
previously the Arab domain. These events hardly represent a fundamental
shift in the balance of power. Nevertheless, for a country that depends on
its cultural superiority, any tremor in this variable reverberates
dramatically.
Hamas and Hezbollah have struck the core Israeli nerve.
Israel cannot ignore it.
Balance in the extended section:
Embedded in Israel's demographic problem is
this: Israel has
national security requirements that outstrip its manpower
base. It
can field a sufficient army, but its industrial base cannot
supply
all of the weapons needed to fight high-intensity conflicts.
This
means it is always dependent on an outside source for
its
industrial base and must align its policies with that source.
At
first this was the Soviets, then France and finally the
United
States. Israel broke with the Soviets and France when
their
political demands became too intense. It was after 1967 that
it
entered into a patron-client relationship with the United
States.
This relationship is its strength and its weakness. It gives
the
Israelis the systems they need for national security, but since
U.S.
and Israeli interests diverge, the relationship constrains
Israel's range
of action.
During the Cold War, the United States relied on Israel for
a
critical geopolitical function. The fundamental U.S. interest
was
Turkey, which controlled the Bosporus and kept the Soviet
fleet
under control in the Mediterranean. The emergence of
Soviet
influence in Syria and Iraq -- which was not driven by U.S.
support
for Israel since the United States did not provide all that
much
support compared to France -- threatened Turkey with attack
from
two directions, north and south. Turkey could not survive
this.
Israel drew Syrian attention away from Turkey by
threatening
Damascus and drawing forces and Soviet equipment away from
the
Turkish frontier. Israel helped secure Turkey and turned a
Soviet
investment into a dry hole.
Once Egypt signed a treaty with
Israel and Sinai became a buffer
zone, Israel became safe from a full
peripheral war -- everyone
attacking at the same time. Jordan was not going
to launch an
attack and Syria by itself could not strike. The danger to
Israel
became Palestinian operations inside of Israel and the
occupied
territories and the threat posed from Lebanon by
the
Syrian-sponsored group Hezbollah.
In 1982, Israel responded to
this threat by invading Lebanon. It
moved as far north as Beirut and the
mountains east and northeast
of it. Israel did not invade Beirut proper,
since Israeli forces do
not like urban warfare as it imposes too high a
rate of attrition.
But what the Israelis found was low-rate attrition.
Throughout
their occupation of Lebanon, they were constantly
experiencing
guerrilla attacks, particularly from
Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has two patrons: Syria and Iran . The
Syrians have used
Hezbollah to pursue their political and business
interests in
Lebanon. Iran has used Hezbollah for business and
ideological
reasons. Business interests were the overlapping element. In
the
interest of business, it became important to Hezbollah, Syria
and
Iran that an accommodation be reached with Israel. Israel wanted
to
withdraw from Lebanon in order to end the constant low-level
combat
and losses.
Israel withdrew in 1988, having reached quiet
understandings with
Syria that Damascus would take responsibility for
Hezbollah, in
return for which Israel would not object to Syrian domination
of
Lebanon. Iran, deep in its war with Iraq, was not in a position
to
object if it had wanted to. Israel returned to its borders in
the
north, maintaining a security presence in the south of Lebanon
that
lasted for several years.
As Lebanon blossomed and Syria's hold
on it loosened, Iran also
began to increase its regional influence. Its
hold on some elements
of Hezbollah strengthened, and in recent months,
Hezbollah --
aligning itself with Iranian Shiite ideology -- has become
more
aggressive. Iranian weapons were provided to Hezbollah,
and
tensions grew along the frontier. This culminated in the capture
of
two soldiers in the north and the current crisis.
It is
difficult to overestimate the impact of the soldier
kidnappings on the
Israeli psyche. First, while the Israeli
military is extremely highly
trained, Israel is also a country with
mass conscription. Having a soldier
kidnapped by Arabs hits every
family in the country. The older generation
is shocked and outraged
that members of the younger generation have been
captured and
worried that they allowed themselves to be captured;
therefore, the
younger generation needs to prove it too can defeat the
Arabs. This
is not a primary driver, but it is a dimension.
The more
fundamental issue is this: Israel withdrew from Lebanon in
order to escape
low-intensity conflict. If Hezbollah is now going
to impose low-intensity
conflict on Israel's border, the rationale
for withdrawal disappears. It is
better for Israel to fight deep in
Lebanon than inside Israel. If the
rockets are going to fall in
Israel proper, then moving into a forward
posture has no cost to
Israel.
From an international standpoint, the
Israelis expect to be
condemned. These international condemnations,
however, are now
having the opposite effect of what is intended. The
Israeli view is
that they will be condemned regardless of what they do.
The
differential between the condemnation of reprisal attacks
and
condemnation of a full invasion is not enough to deter more
extreme
action. If Israel is going to be attacked anyway, it might as
well
achieve its goals.
Moreover, an invasion of Hezbollah-held
territory aligns Israel
with the United States. U.S. intelligence has been
extremely
concerned about the growing activity of Hezbollah, and
U.S.
relations with Iran are not good. Lebanon is the center of
gravity
of Hezbollah, and the destruction of Hezbollah capabilities
in
Lebanon, particularly the command structure, would cripple
Hezbollah
operations globally in the near future. The United States
would very much
like to see that happen, but cannot do it itself.
Moreover, an Israeli
action would enrage the Islamic world, but it
would also drive home the
limits of Iranian power. Once again, Iran
would have dropped Lebanon in the
grease, and not been hurt itself.
The lesson of Hezbollah would not be lost
on the Iraqi Shia -- or
so the Bush administration would
hope.
Therefore, this is one Israeli action that benefits the
United
States, and thus helps the immediate situation as well as
long-term
geopolitical alignments. It realigns the United States and
Israel.
This also argues that any invasion must be devastating
to
Hezbollah. It must go deep. It must occupy temporarily. It
must
shatter Hezbollah.
At this point, the Israelis appear to be
unrolling a war plan in
this direction. They have blockaded the Lebanese
coast. Israeli
aircraft are attacking what air power there is in Lebanon,
and have
attacked Hezbollah and other key
command-and-control
infrastructure. It would follow that the Israelis will
now
concentrate on destroying Hezbollah -- and Lebanese
--
communications capabilities and attacking munitions dumps,
vehicle
sites, rocket-storage areas and so forth.
Most important,
Israel is calling up its reserves. This is never a
symbolic gesture in
Israel. All Israelis below middle age are in
the reserves and mobilization
is costly in every sense of the word.
If the Israelis were planning a
routine reprisal, they would not be
mobilizing. But they are, which means
they are planning to do
substantially more than retributive airstrikes. The
question is
what their plan is.
Given the blockade and what appears
to be the shape of the
airstrikes, it seems to us at the moment the
Israelis are planning
to go fairly deep into Lebanon. The logical first
step is a move to
the Litani River in southern Lebanon. But given the
missile attacks
on Haifa, they will go farther, not only to attack launcher
sites,
but to get rid of weapons caches. This means a move deep into
the
Bekaa Valley, the seat of Hezbollah power and the location of
plants
and facilities. Such a penetration would leave Israeli
forces' left flank
open, so a move into Bekaa would likely be
accompanied by attacks to the
west. It would bring the Israelis
close to Beirut again.
This leaves
Israel's right flank exposed, and that exposure is to
Syria. The Israeli
doctrine is that leaving Syrian airpower intact
while operating in Lebanon
is dangerous. Therefore, Israel must at
least be considering using its air
force to attack Syrian
facilities, unless it gets ironclad assurances the
Syrians will not
intervene in any way. Conversations are going on between
Egypt and
Syria, and we suspect this is the subject. But Israel would
not
necessarily object to the opportunity of eliminating Syrian
air
power as part of its operation, or if Syria chooses, going
even
further.
At the same time, Israel does not intend to get bogged
down in
Lebanon again. It will want to go in, wreak havoc, withdraw.
That
means it will go deeper and faster, and be more devastating,
than
if it were planning a long-term occupation. It will go in
to
liquidate Hezbollah and then leave. True, this is no final
solution,
but for the Israelis, there are no final solutions.
Israeli forces are
already in Lebanon. Its special forces are
inside identifying targets for
airstrikes. We expect numerous air
attacks over the next 48 hours, as well
as reports of firefights in
southern Lebanon. We also expect more rocket
attacks on Israel.
It will take several days to mount a full invasion
of Lebanon. We
would not expect major operations before the weekend at
the
earliest. If the rocket attacks are taking place, however,
Israel
might send several brigades to the Litani River almost
immediately
in order to move the rockets out of range of Haifa. Therefore,
we
would expect a rapid operation in the next 24-48 hours followed by
a
larger force later.
At this point, the only thing that can prevent this
would be a
major intervention by Syria with real guarantees that it
would
restrain Hezbollah and indications such operations are under
way.
Syria is the key to a peaceful resolution. Syria must calculate
the
relative risks, and we expect them to be unwilling to
act
decisively.
Therefore:
1. Israel cannot tolerate an
insurgency on its northern frontier;
if there is one, it wants it farther
north.
2. It cannot tolerate attacks on Haifa.
3. It cannot
endure a crisis of confidence in its military
4. Hezbollah cannot back
off of its engagement with Israel.
5. Syria can stop this, but the cost
to it stopping it is higher
than the cost of letting it go on.
It
would appear Israel will invade Lebanon. The global response
will be noisy.
There will be no substantial international action
against Israel. Beirut's
tourism and transportation industry, as
well as its financial sectors, are
very much at risk.
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